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ABSTRACT 
The Federal Government recognizes that collaboration 
between the various departments and local, federal, and 
private sector can best support maritime security.  Of 
course the question is how to get these entities to 
collaborate?  Collaborative technology can provide an 
answer to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Emergency 
Response collaboration, but the right tool for this mission 
must be selected.  In order for the right tool to be 
selected, then the right criteria must be used to evaluate 
the tool for this particular mission.  The criteria must 
not only look at the tool or the network, but the whole 
picture: cognitive processes, organizational structure, and 
the doctrine and procedures of the players involved. 
This thesis will focus on establishing criteria for 
evaluating collaborative tools in the tactical environment 
of MDA and Emergency Response collaboration. In this 
environment, an Incident Commander will need to coordinate 
military, coalition, federal, state, local entities, as 
well as non-governmental organizations. A methodology does 
exist that meets these criteria, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Code of Best Practice for assessing Command 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1 
A. BACKGROUND .........................................1 
B. COLLABORATIVE TECHNOLOGIES .........................3 
1. Web Conferencing ...............................3 
2. Virtual Spaces ..................................4 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT ..................................4 
 
II. THE NATO COBP FOR C2 ASSESSMENT .........................9 
A. BACKGROUND .........................................9 
B. WHY NATO COBP IS A GOOD METHODOLOGY FOR 
EVALUATING COLLABORATIVE TOOLS FOR EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE ..........................................10 
C. WHAT IS THE NATO COBP PROCESS? ....................11 
1. Steps Applied to the Process ..................12 
a. Problem Formulation & Solution Strategy ...13 
b. Measures of Merit .........................14 
c. Scenarios/Human and Organizational 
Factors .................................16 
2. Challenges of the Top-Down Approach to C2 
Analysis ......................................17 
III. TACTICAL USER REQUIREMENTS .............................19 
A. HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS COMPARED ..................19 
1.  Organizational Structure .......................20 
2. Technology .....................................21 
3. Conclusions from Analysis ......................23 
B.  THE ROLE OF COLLABORATIVE TOOLS ...................24 
IV.   METRICS AND EXPERIMENTATION ..........................27 
A.  METRICS TO BE USED FOR EVALUATION .................27 
B.  EXPERIMENTS THAT CAN PROVIDE TESTING ..............42 
1. Strong Angel III Disaster Relief Demonstration 
Overview ......................................42 
a. Scenario ..................................42 
2.  TNT MDA Experiment Overview ...................43 
a. Scenario ..................................43 
 viii
V.   RESULTS ..............................................45 
A.  MS GROOVE EVALUATION ..............................45 
1. Evaluation of MS Groove During Strong Angel 
III ...........................................45 
2. Evaluation of MS Groove During TNT Experiment ..46 
3. MS GROOVE CONCLUSIONS BASED ON BOTH 
EXPERIMENTS ...................................46 
B.  STRONG ANGEL III OBSERVATIONS FOR METRIC 
REFINEMENT ........................................47 
1. People/Structure ...............................47 
2. Technology .....................................48 
C.  TNT EXPERIMENT OBSERVATIONS FOR METRIC REFINEMENT .49 
1. People/Structure ...............................49 
2.  Technology .....................................50 
VI. CONCLUSIONS .............................................51 
A. CRITERIA ESTABLISHMENT ............................51 
B.  THE FUTURE ROLE OF COLLABORATIVE TOOLS ............52 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................53 










LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. C2 Assessment Process...........................12 
Figure 2. Problem Formulation Process (NATO COBP).........13 
Figure 3. Solution Strategy Process (NATO COBP)...........14 
Figure 4. Relationships between the Measures of Merit.....15 
Figure 5. Collaborative Tool Role and Organizational 
Structure.......................................26 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Current Collaborative Technologies on the Market 
as Compiled by MITRE.............................6 
Table 2. Differences Between MOOTW and Conventional Warfare ..9 
Table 3. Information Sharing Priorities Outlined in .........22 
 National Plan for Achieving MDA.................22 
Table 4. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding .....29 
 Dimensional Parameters..........................29 
Table 5. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding .....30 
 Measures of Performance.........................30 
Table 6. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding .....31 
 Measures of Performance (continued).............31 
Table 7. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding .....32 
 Measures of Effectiveness.......................32 
Table 8. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding .....33 
 Measures of Effectiveness (continued)...........33 
Table 9. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding .....34 
 Measures of Effectiveness (continued)...........34 
Table 10. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding ....35 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Dr. Alex Bordetsky and Professor 
Sue Higgins for their mentoring and support. Their 
knowledge has allowed me to see collaboration both from a 
technical and social aspect.  I would also like to thank 
Alex for his guidance throughout the last two years.  In 
addition, I would also like to thank Mr. Phil Wiliker, 
NORTHCOM, for providing time and guidance to a young junior 
officer to assist him in the right direction on 
Collaborative Technology requirements, and LTCOL Karl 
Pfeiffer, USAF, for always taking the time to provide 
necessary guidance to a lost naval Junior Officer.    
On a personal note, I want to thank Mr. Mike Homen, 
and his wife, Barbra for their continued guidance over the 
past two years, and Ms. Alena Neighbors for her love, 
support, and keeping me on the straight and narrow while 
writing this thesis.  Finally, I want to thank my father 
and mother, Ira and Honora Wagreich, for their insistence 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Imagine a routine cargo vessel entering San Francisco 
Bay carrying a routine container with a routine crew, or so 
the ship’s manifest says.  In reality, two members of the 
crew support a terrorist network and have shipped a nuclear 
agent capable of disrupting the city of San Francisco. How 
can we quickly interdict and capture the terrorist cell?  
How do our emergency response units (fire, medical, and 
police) respond with military assistance?  It seems like 
the plot of a movie, but since September 11, 2001, this 
scenario has become an event that federal, state, and local 
agencies have sought strategies to address.  Of course, the 
current National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 
2005) concedes that various departments, federal, state, 
and local, have carried out their own strategies and 
solutions for the above questions.  In December 2004, the 
President directed the Secretaries of the Department of 
Defense and Homeland Security to lead the Federal effort to 
develop a comprehensive National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, to better integrate and synchronize the existing 
Department-level strategies and ensure their effective and 
efficient implementation. 
In his speech to the Cleveland City Press Club, 
Commandant of the Coast Guard Thomas Collins said, “Well, 
the plan, stated in its simplest terms, is to identify and 
intercept threats well before they reach our shores. 
Realization of this goal depends on timely information-
sharing, protecting our vital maritime infrastructure, 
partnering with others at home and abroad, building on 
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current international cooperative security efforts, and 
preparing to respond quickly to future events.”1  His 
speech entitled “Collaboration: The Pathway to Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) Success” indeed shows the necessity 
of collaboration between various agencies to achieve unity 
of effort in maritime security and emergency response to an 
MDA threat.  The Maritime Domain is defined as all areas 
and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or 
bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, 
including all maritime related activities, infrastructure, 
people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.2  Maritime 
Domain Awareness is defined as the effective understanding 
of anything associated with the maritime domain that could 
impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the 
United States.3
The National Strategy for Maritime Security states 
that maritime security is best achieved by blending public 
and private maritime security activities on a global scale 
into an integrated effort that addresses all maritime 
threats.  The Strategy aligns all Federal government 
maritime security programs and initiatives into a 
comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving 
appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector 
entities.4
  
 1 Admiral Thomas Collins, USCG, “Collaboration: The Path to Maritime 
Domain Awareness Success,” June 2005. 
2 National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41, 21 December 2004, 
p. 5. 
3 Ibid. 
4 National Strategy for Maritime Security, Department of Homeland 
Security, September 2005, p. ii.  
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B. COLLABORATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
“Collaboration is the key to improving maritime security,” Admiral 
Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard, June 2005. 
The Federal Government recognizes that collaboration 
between the various departments and local, federal, and 
private sector can best support maritime security.  Of 
course the question is how to get these entities to 
collaborate?  The private sector and the federal government 
have often provided technological solutions aimed at 
facilitating collaboration.5
What capabilities are necessary in the collaborative 
tools that will be employed?  For federal agencies, the 
following capabilities are required as outlined in the 
December 9, 2005 Statement of Objectives for the new DoD 
Standard Collaborative Tool, the Net-Centric Enterprise 
Services (NCES): 
1. Web Conferencing   
For the Department of Defense, web conferencing is the 
most important standard capability for a collaborative 
tool.6 It must provide the capability for users to meet 
virtually to conduct meetings, hold training, host 
conferences, etc.7  Web conferencing must be available in 
two variations.8  The first variation is ad hoc web 
conferencing sessions in which a virtual room is created 
when the meeting starts and dissolved when the last user 
departs.  The second type of web conferencing is persistent  5 OSD-C4I, DOD Standard Collaborative Tool Implementation Overview, 
GENADMIN, 101431ZAUG2001, p. 1. 
6 Net-Centric Enterprise Services Statement of Objectives, Defense 
Information Systems Agency, 9 December 2005, p. 2.  
7 Defense Information Systems Agency.  Net-Centric Enterprise 
Services Statement of Objectives, 9 December 2005, p. 1.  
8 Ibid. 
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sessions in which the virtual rooms remain in existence 
regardless if any user is in attendance.  
2. Virtual Spaces 
The second capability requested for the Department of 
Defense is virtual spaces.9  This capability permits users 
to collaborate asynchronously. With this capability, users 
would be able to indefinitely store files online and share 
them with some, all, or no other users.10
 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There are many tools that are available that meet 
these capabilities stated in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) requirements.  Table 1 is the current list, compiled 
by MITRE, of the collaborative tools that are available for 
local, state, and federal entities to choose from. 
AUDIO/VIDEO CONFERENCING  
Camfrog Video Chat Speak Freely
eyeballchat Sun Microsystems ShowMe
MASH multicast-based collaborative apps. TelNetZ, Inc. 
MBONE Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Vat TeraGlobal - Session
MBONE Lawrence Berkelely National Lab Vic VocalTec Internet Phone
Microsoft NetMeeting VTEL Video Conferencing System
Teleconferencing Central (online resource) White Pines Cu-SeeMe Conferencing
  
CONFERENCE SERVERS 
Lotus - neT.120 Conference Server PictureTel NetConference Multipoint Server
                     9 Defense Information Systems Agency.  Net-Centric Enterprise 
Services Statement of Objectives, 9 December 2005, p. 1. 
10 Ibid. 
5 
Persystant's Conferport VocalTec Conference Server
Cisco ICS Collaboration Server White Pines MeetingPoint Conference Server
  
TEXT CHAT AND INSTANT MESSAGING 
AOL Instant Messenger MSN Messenger 1.0 ICQ




Gale Messaging System Omniprise
DigiChat Quicksilver
Jabber SIMP
General Dynamics InfoWorkSpace LaunchPad Trillian
Mirabilis ICQ Volano Chat
Microsoft Chat 2 Way Interactive Messaging
MindAlign Worlds 3D Chat
  Yahoo Messenger
  Zircon IRC Chat
  
DATA CONFERENCING  
Databeam FarSite Netopia Timbuktu
Facilitate.com Netscape Conference 
Intel Proshare Sun Microsystems SunForum
Glance Placebased LiveMeeting 
Microsoft NetMeeting White Pines Cu-SeeMe Conferencing
Meetingworks WebEx
Latutude - MeetingPlace   
  
PLACE-BASED COLLABORATION ENVIRONMENTS  
Centra Lotus SameTime
ComanyWay MShow
DSTC/DARPA WORLDS Project MindAlign
eRoom MITRE CVW Open Source Project
Extranet Secure Portals Microsoft Netmeeting
General Dynamics InfoWorkSpace Paragon Dynamics Virtual Environment Solutions
Groove Collabraspace
iOra SPAWAR Odyssey Collaboration System
GroupServe SiteScape
GroupSystems TeamWave Workplace
Presence-AR TelNetZ, Inc. 
WorkZone Extranet Web 4M
  
COLLABORATIVE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
CollabNet Rational
Embarcadero Technologies CanyonBlue
TogetherSoft Collaboration Technologies Inc.
  
DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT 
chrome – Nextpage  
  
 
Table 1. Current Collaborative Technologies on the Market 
as Compiled by MITRE 
As this table shows, there are many tools that 
federal, state, and local entities can employ.  As the 
private sector continues to provide tools that facilitate 
6 
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collaboration, there must be criteria in place that enable 
the users to evaluate the selection of the tool.  The 
criteria that are being used for source selection provides 
a broad view and focuses more on how the tool effects the 
computer network or the capabilities of the tool itself.11   
Collaborative technology can provide an answer to MDA 
and Emergency Response collaboration, but the right tool 
for this mission must be selected.  In order for the right 
tool to be selected, then the right criteria must be used 
to evaluate the tool for this particular mission.  The 
criteria must not only look at the tool or the network, but 
the whole picture: cognitive processes, organizational 
structure, and the doctrine and procedures of the players 
involved.  We must also realize that the collaborative 
environment shifts depending on which level of planning and 
execution the tool will be used: strategic, operational, or 
tactical.  Of course as one moves from the tactical to the 
strategic level of planning and execution of Maritime 
Domain Awareness and Emergency Response, the environment 
increases in complexity and dynamics.   
 This thesis focuses on establishing criteria for 
evaluating collaborative tools in the tactical environment 
of MDA and Emergency Response collaboration. In this 
environment, first responders are from military entities, 
law enforcement, and federal, state, and local emergency 
entities.  The on-scene commander (OSC) must coordinate 
these entities. In addition, international organizations 
may also provide assets for support.  This means that the 
criteria must utilize a methodology that focuses on Joint-
interagency collaboration with the possibility of working 
 11 NCES Critical Comments, 9 December 2005. 
8 
with a coalition and civilian agencies.  A methodology does 
exist that meets these criteria, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Code of Best Practice (NATO COBP) for 






































II. THE NATO COBP FOR C2 ASSESSMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been involved 
in missions that are not military in nature, or Operations 
Other Than War (OOTW).  We have seen NATO used for 
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and has 
also been deployed to areas outside the European continent.  
These missions have ensured that collaboration between NATO 
military commanders and civilian agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and state entities has a necessity 
for successful operations. 
 Table 2 taken from the NATO COBP below demonstrates 





Table 2. Differences Between MOOTW and Conventional Warfare 
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Advances in technology, particularly information 
related technologies, offer military organizations 
unprecedented opportunities to significantly reduce the fog 
and friction traditionally associated with conflict.12  At 
the same time, they may prove to be challenges in 
themselves across a wide variety of realms: technical, 
organizational, and cultural.13  Therefore, in order for 
analysts to properly evaluate technology, one must look at 
these dimensions and see how organizational and processes 
influence the tools that need to be looked at. The NATO 
COBP provides a generic methodology that can help an 
analyst take all these aspects into consideration when 
developing the criteria to analyze tools. 
 
B. WHY NATO COBP IS A GOOD METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING 
COLLABORATIVE TOOLS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
If the NATO COBP is a top-down approach that depends 
on user requirements and Measures of Merit (MoM) that may 
not fully address the dynamics in coordinating emergency 
response for an MDA threat, why use it?  First of all, the 
NATO COBP provides a generic methodology to looking at C2 
assessment.  It is up to the analyst to use the process to 
define a specific problem.  Secondly, the Operational 
environment which MDA Threat Response falls into is an area 
the Department of Defense refers to as: Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW).  Joint Publication 3-07, delineates 
Six Principles for MOOTW: objective, unity of effort, 
security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.14  
 12 SAS-026.  The NATO CODE OF BEST PRACTICE for C2 Assessment.  CCRP, 
2002, p. 2. 
13 Ibid. 
14 JP3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 
DoD, 16 June 1995, p. II-1. 
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Compare these principles that guide MOOTW with the 
principles outlined in the National Plan to Achieve MDA and 
one can make a few comparisons: unity of effort, 
information sharing and integration, safe and efficient 
flow of commerce.15  One can see the principles of unity of 
effort, security, and perseverance in the MDA principles. 
The statement that opens the principles, ”The first step 
towards meeting these principles is to ensure GMCOI 
stakeholders, at all levels, know what they can do to help, 
how they can do it and, most importantly why Maritime 
Domain Awareness is in their collective best interest,16” 
shows that MDA is attempting to obtain the legitimacy 
principle of MOOTW as well.  The focus of the NATO COBP is 
to provide a methodology to assess Command and Control (C2) 
technology within a MOOTW environment given the complexity 
of civilian-military-coalition operations.  This 
environment coincides with the environment that the 
collaborative technology would be used for in a tactical 
MDA emergency response. 
 
C. WHAT IS THE NATO COBP PROCESS? 
The NATO COBP offers broad guidance on the assessment 
of C2 for the purposes of supporting a wide variety of 
decision makers.17 It should be noted that the COBP is 
focused upon the assessment challenges associated with the 
nature of C2, and does not provide a specific solution to a 
C2-related problem. 
 15 Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime 
Domain Awareness, October 2005, p. 4. 
16 Ibid, p. 3. 
17 Ibid, p. 11. 
 
 
1. Steps Applied to the Process 
 All steps of assessing C2 systems are interrelated and 
hence interdependent.  Figure 1 taken from the NATO COBP 
outlines these phases and interrelationships. 
   
 
Figure 1.   C2 Assessment Process 
 
 
The phases are Problem Formulation and Solution 
Strategy; Measures of Merit, Scenarios, and Human and 
Organizational Factors Analysis; Methods and Data 
12 
Requirements; and finally Risk Assessment and products 
finalization. 
a. Problem Formulation & Solution Strategy 
According to the NATO COBP, problem formulation 
involves decomposition of the analytic problem into 
appropriate dimensions such as structures, functions, 
mission areas, command echelons, and C2 systems18.  The NATO 
COBP states that this is an ongoing process, as outlined in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Problem Formulation Process (NATO COBP) 
 
Chapter III will provide a discussion of the key 
issues. 
A solution strategy is “How” the assessment of the 
technologies will take place.  It includes the statement of 
work outlined by the sponsor, experimentation campaign 
                    
13 
 18 SAS-026.  NATO COBP for C2 Assessment, CCRP, 2002, p. 54. 
plan, and study management plan.19  Figure 3 outlines the 
process of the solution strategy.  The solution strategy is 
discussed in Chapter IV in the form of scenarios integrated 
into the Tactical Network Topology Experiments and the 
Strong Angel Disaster Relief Series. 
 
Figure 3.   Solution Strategy Process (NATO COBP) 
 
b. Measures of Merit 
The reason the NATO COBP is a good process for 
evaluating collaborative tools is that the Measures of 
Merit (MoM), the evaluation criteria, looks at not only the 
technology, but also its impact on the decision makers, the 
cognitive processes, organizational structure, and policy 
or doctrine.  The NATO COBP utilizes a hierarchy of MoM, 
arranged into five categories.  Dimensional Parameters are 
the most basic and focus on the properties or 
characteristics inherent in the physical C2 systems.20 Next 
are Measures of Performance (MoP), which focus on internal 
                     19 SAS-026.  NATO COBP for C2 Assessment, CCRP, 2002, p. 38.  
20 Ibid., p. 92. 
14 
system structure, characteristics and behavior.21 Next are 
Measures of C2 Effectiveness (MoCE), which focus on the 
impact of C2 systems within the operational context.22 Next 
are Measures of Force Effectiveness (MoFE), which focus on 
how a force performs its mission or the degree to which it 
meets its objectives.23 The highest levels of MoM are 
Measures of Policy Effectiveness (MoPE), which focus on 
policy and societal outcomes.24  The relationships of these 
five relationships are shown in Figure 4 as taken from the 
COBP. 
 










                    
c. Scenarios/Human and Organizational Factors 
The NATO COBP defines scenario as a description 
of the area, the environment, means, objectives, and events 
related to a conflict or a crisis during a specified time 
frame suited for satisfactory study objectives and the 
problem analysis directives.25  Scenarios consists of four 
elements—a context (i.e. geopolitical situation), the 
participants (e.g., intentions, capabilities of blue, red, 
others), the environment, and the evolution of events in 
time.26 In C2 assessments, the purpose of scenarios is to 
ensure that the analysis is informed by the appropriate 
range of opportunities to observe the relevant variables 
and their interrelationships.27
The human dimension is one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of C2.  The NATO COBP addresses these 
characteristics into three categories.  The first category 
is human behavior related to performance degradation, such 
as stress and fatigue, and as a consequence of social 
interactions among individuals and members of groups.28  The 
second is decision-making behavior (cognitive questions) 
including the cognitive complexity of the issues and the 
capacities of the commanders or other decisionmakers of 
interest.29  The last is command style.30 These issues and 
factors are discussed in Chapter III of the thesis. 
 
 
 25 SAS-026. NATO COBP for C2 Assessment, CCRP, 2002, p. 164. 
26 Ibid., p. 165. 
27 Ibid. 




                    
2. Challenges of the Top-Down Approach to C2 Analysis  
The NATO COBP utilizes a top-down approach to 
analyzing the C2 system.  With a top down approach, higher 
level echelons determine the user requirements and the MoM 
that needs to be considered in the problem formulation.  
The challenge with a top down approach is that the 
requirements may fit the strategic and operational 
dimensions that the various services or agencies need.  The 
user requirements for example in the Net-Centric Enterprise 
Service (NCES), the new collaborative tool for the 
Department of Defense, the Selection process came from the 
Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs.31  These 
individuals, however, operate on the strategic and 
operational levels of warfare. However, these requirements 
may not fully address the dynamics in coordinating 
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III. TACTICAL USER REQUIREMENTS 
A. HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS COMPARED 
On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, which directs the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a 
National Incident Management System (NIMS). According to 
HSPD-5: This system will provide a consistent nationwide 
approach for Federal, State,2 and local3 governments to work 
effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless 
of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for 
interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, 
and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of 
concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies 
covering the incident command system; multiagency 
coordination systems; unified command; training; 
identification and management of resources (including 
systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications 
and certification; and the collection, tracking, and 
reporting of incident information and incident resources.32  
Beginning in FY 2006, federal funding for state, local and 
tribal preparedness grants will be tied to compliance with 
the NIMS.33  With funding on the line, any collaborative 
tool will need to ensure it complies with the procedures, 
organizational structure outlined in the NIMS. 
The NIMS outlines both the organizational structure and 
the technology requirements that need to be in place so 
 32 George Bush.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, 
Department of Homeland Security, 28 February 2003, p. 1. 
33 Alex Bordetsky, et. al. Progress Report on the NJ Emergency 
Response Network, May 2006, p. 7. 
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that a collaborative tool needs to be tied into or measured 
against.  
In addition, for a joint collaborative tool between the 
military and the first responders in responding to an MDA 
threat, a comparative study must be made that looks at both 
the traditional Maritime Component Command Structure and 
the NIMS.  
1. Organizational Structure 
When various agencies arrive on the scene in a 
disaster most organizations find themselves in a chaotic 
environment.  There are “social and technical blinders” 
established where people are focused on their own agendas.  
The challenge, therefore, with emergency response is how to 
get the people to go past their own agendas and see each 
other as allies rather than adversaries in support of a 
mission.  An organizational structure does provide that 
capability on a human side. 
The NIMS provides a dynamic bottom-up command and 
control structure.  An incident commander is generally a 
local policeman, fireman, or emergency technician.  As the 
incident increases in complexity, so does the seniority of 
the incident commander: going from local, to city, to 
county, to state, and final federal agencies.  All agencies 
are supporting the incident commander, which could be a 
local/city/or state agency. The NIMS also provides the 
ability of an agency to emerge within the command and 
control structure quickly and easily.  
This differs from the military traditional command and 
control structure in which command is given to the senior 
person present.  Nevertheless, the goals of the incident 
commander are the same in emergency response as they are in 
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maritime domain awareness: achieve Unity of Effort from all 
participants and make decisions as timely and accurate as 
possible. 
2. Technology 
One of the main elements of maintaining unity of 
effort is the establishment of shared situational awareness 
or a common operational picture.  The NIMS training online 
states: “Effective communications, information management, 
and information and intelligence sharing are critical 
aspects of domestic incident management. Establishing and 
maintaining a common operating picture and ensuring 
accessibility and interoperability are principal goals of 
communications and information management.”34  If we look at 
the priorities needed for Information Sharing from the 
National Plan for Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness 
outlined in Table 3 below, we see two comparative 
requirements for the sharing of information: establish a 
Common Operational Picture (COP) for all entities and 
technology must be interoperable with all players. 
 34 http://www.nimsonline.com, Official NIMS training website, 
Communications and Information Management Session. 
 
 
Table 3. Information Sharing Priorities Outlined in 





3. Conclusions from Analysis 
Based on the analysis of the priorities and the way 
emergency response and the military will be operating, we 
see similar issues and requirements being generated.  We 
see organizational structures that will be hierarchical and 
static where the players are known: a boarding team 
reaching to databases for information or a law enforcement 
squad responding to a boat in the harbor.  However, both 
the National Plan for MDA and the NIMS argue that 
traditional structures may not adequately address the 
terrorist threat.  
An ad hoc organizational structure can provide the 
dynamic organizational need to address both emergency 
response and MDA.  A Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 
for the military or a Unified Command (UC) Structure for 
the civilian first responders can provide this ad hoc 
structure.  Within these structures various agencies can 
come together under a JIATF or Unified Commander.  By 
collaboration, these entities provide the necessary unity 
of effort needed to obtain a successful operation.  In both 
cases, the goal is to share information and maintain a 
Common Operational Picture.  The selected technology must 
support both the military and the civilian side in order to 
ensure collaboration between civilian first responders and 
military support for domestic MDA threats.  At the same 
time, the technology must also provide the decision makers 
the ability to make decisions as quickly and as accurately 
as possible. The technology must not only allow humans to 
collaborate and achieve unity of effort, but also be 
interoperable with each other in order to facilitate human 
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collaboration. How will a collaborative tool fit into this 
picture?  
 
B.  THE ROLE OF COLLABORATIVE TOOLS 
Microsoft Groove was the main collaborative technology 
used by disaster relief teams during Hurricane Katrina.  MS 
Groove is a collaborative tool that offers a standard 
workspace that includes whiteboard, file sharing, chat, 
VOIP, project management, and instant messaging capability.  
A study of how Groove was used in a traditional 
organizational structure provides a glimpse at how the 
technology was used.  As a response, to Hurricane Katrina, 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) sent two detachments to the 
Gulf Coast.  If one looks at the Task Force Katrina 
Workspace for NPS Detachment 2 in Groove, we see the 
following data: 
1. Chat was limited to determining who was who inside 
the network during the early phases when the 
network was in the process of being established. 
2. The functions that were used the most were the 
file sharing and discussion capabilities. 
In contrast, we can look at the MS Groove Workspace 
for the cooperative NPS-Special Forces Command (SOCOM) 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) Field Experiments.  
These experiments are covered in greater detail in the next 
chapter.  By looking at the Katrina Workspace, MS Groove’s 
file sharing capability was extensively used. This 
information was used by the Joint Forces Maritime Component 
Commander (JFMCC) for making decisions.  Likewise, MS 
Groove’s file sharing capability and discussion board were 
used extensively in support of a boarding party during the 
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MIO Field Experiments for helping participants make a 
decision with regard to the MDA Threat.  However, unlike, 
the Katrina situation, the chat capability was extensively 
used, allowing peer-to-peer relationships to exist between 
the participants in communicating.  A collaborative 
technology that provides or an organizational structure 
that uses chat, instant messaging, and other peer-to-peer 
services, has the potential of transforming a traditional 
C2 structure into an ad hoc structure.  Likewise, an ad hoc 
structure would rely heavily not only on the file sharing 
and discussion board features, but also chat, instant 
messaging, and other peer-to-peer services.  Figure 5 shows 
the two roles that a collaborative tool can provide to an 
organization, either as a collaborative mechanism for 
transformation or as a decision support tool. 
  






















IV.   METRICS AND EXPERIMENTATION 
A.  METRICS TO BE USED FOR EVALUATION 
 From the previous chapter, there are several areas 
that an analyst evaluating the tool needs to look at.  The 
first area is the interoperability of the tool.  In terms 
of the NATO COBP Measures of Merit, interoperability can be 
an area for evaluation as a Measure of Performance (MOP), 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE), Measure of Force 
Effectiveness (MOFE), and Measure of Policy Effectiveness 
(MOPE).  As a MOP, interoperability can be determined in 
two ways.  In accordance with the NIMS, all entities 
participating in an emergency response check-in with a 
Liaison Officer, assigned to the Command Staff of the 
Incident Commander.  For a collaborative tool to really be 
interoperable, it should be able to interact with most of 
the tools that are at the disposal of the Incident 
Commander.  The second phase of interoperability is how 
quickly the tool can be accessed once interfacing with 
another tool.  In terms of the other Measures of Merit 
associated with interoperability, surveys given to the 
decision makers who would be using the tool, could provide 
data.  Unfortunately, the data collected from these surveys 
are “fuzzy information,” since they are based on the 
subjective view of the users.  In order to provide more 
objective data, sampling a greater audience of users would 
generate a normal distribution of the answers. 
 Situational Awareness (SA) and the ability to provide 
a Common Operational Picture (COP) is another area for 
evaluation.  In order to evaluate the SA, the scenario must 
provide major events that participants must respond.  All 
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users of the collaborative tool should be asked about their 
understanding of the situation after the event is planned.  
Again, each user will write about their experience and 
their piece of the situation, so the information may be 
“fuzzy.”  By providing a broad range of users and a large 
sample audience, the information should unfold into a 
normal distribution of the data. 
 However, there must be other issues that need to be 
considered.  During the Strong Angel III Disaster Relief 
Demonstration, many collaborative tools were brought into 
the field.  There, feasibility and ease of use were 
definitely factors in the success of the operations that 
were unfolding during the exercise.  Based on the After 
Action Report and Lesson Learned from Hurricane Katrina and 
my observations from Strong Angel (more detailed in Chapter 
V), Table 4 provides general questions an analyst should 
consider when evaluating a tool to be used for emergency 
response and civilian-military MDA response for a selection 
authority (FEMA, federal, state, local, military, DHS, 
etc.)  Prior to selection of the tool for general 
distribution, the answers to these questions should be used 










Tool Evaluated Date: 
Capabilities What services does 
this tool offer? 










How much memory is 
required to run 
the program? 
 
How many users can 























Table 4. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding  
  Dimensional Parameters 
30 
 
Measures of Performance 
Tool Evaluated Date: 
Scalability 
 
How fast does a 
user get access to 
the tool as the 
number of users 
increase? 
 
How fast do 
clients retrieve 
information as the 
number of clients 
on the network 
increases? 
 
How much memory is 
required as each 




Network  effects 
 
How much of the 
Available band- 
width is used to 
support users? 
 
As client usage 




Table 5. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding  










How many users are 
able to get access 
to documents? 
 
How often is the 







How much of the 




How much of the 
data used is 
created by “non- 
trusted” agents? 
 








Of the systems 
available for use, 




How fast can the 
tool be set up and 
made operational 






Can the tool be 
used on FCC 
unlicensed bands? 
 
Can the tool be 
easily deployed? 
 
Table 6. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding  




Measures of Effectiveness 







How many files are
posted in the file 
sharing area? 
 
How many files posted 
are needed by the 
user? 
 
How many Requests for 
Information are 
submitted by the 
users? 
 
Which users did not 








features were not 




Table 7. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding  





ecision Support How fast was the DM 
process made with the 
tool? 
 
How fast is the DM 
process without the 
tool? 
 
Once information was 
posted in the tool, 
how quickly did the 
DM get that 
information? 
 
Did the tool provide 
a clear understanding 
to the DM of where 
the information was 
located? 
 
Did the tool provide 
a capability to alert 
decision maker that 




features did the DM 
like and use in the 
DM process? 
 
How did the tool help 
the process? 
 
How does the process 
change with this 
collaborative tool? 
 
Table 8. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding  






What were the 
objectives of the 
Response Team? 
 









Is the tool a burden 








Did the tool make 
both the IC and EOC 
Commander aware of 
what tasks still need 
to be complete to 
fulfill mission  
objectives? 
 
Did the tool enable 
the IC and EOC 
Commander to come to 
an agreement as to 
what still needs to 
occur to complete 
mission 
objectives?   
 
Did the tool alert 
the ICP and EOC of 
major situations that 
were occurring during 
the course of the 
incident? 
 
Table 9. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding  





On the application 
level, how many 
applications cannot 
interface with the 
tool? 
 
On the network level, 
how many information 
networks available to 
the IC and staff, can 
the tool operate on? 
 
Of the users that the 
IC needs for 
decisions, how many 
cannot use the tool? 
 
Table 10. Overarching Questions for an Analyst Regarding  
  Measures of Effectiveness (continued) 
 
 A survey is the best method of getting answers to 
these questions.  Below is an example of survey questions 
that provide more specific answers to the questions in 
Table 6. The tool that will be evaluated is MS Groove 
during the MIO Experiments between 29 August and 1 
September 1, 2006 in Alameda Bay.  Keep in mind that the 
answers are subjective to the view of the users.  
Therefore, the more users that take the survey, the better 
the distribution of answers, and hopefully, the more 
objective the analysis will provide. 
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TNT 06-4 Survey 
 
Name:___________________  Position: _______________ 
Date: ___________________ Tool Evaluated: _MS GROOVE__
 
Part I: Experience with MS Groove 
 
A.  Prior to exercise 
 
1. On average how often did I use MS Groove prior to the 
exercise? 
1  2  3   4  5 




2.  The training I received on MS Groove was beneficial? 
1  2  3  4  5  6   
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly N/A 










Part II: Interaction with the tool 
 
1.  It was easy for me to find the information I needed 
from MS Groove discussion and file sharing. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 







2.  MS Groove alerts helped me realize when new information 
was available. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







3.  MS Groove made it easier to get data from the boarding 
party. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







4. MS Groove made it easier to get data from advisory 
entities like Biometrics Fusion Center and Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







Part III.  Situational Awareness
 
1. What is your understanding of the situation as of 












2.  MS Groove’s features (chat, discussion board, etc.) 
made it easier to come to an understanding of the 
situation. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







3.  MS Groove made it easier for me to maintain control of 
the situation. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







4.  MS Groove improved my ability to coordinate assets. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  








5. MS Groove improved my ability to track assets. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







Part IV.  Decision Support 
 
1. MS Groove allowed me to make faster decisions. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







2. MS Groove was the primary means of sharing my thoughts 
with necessary participants. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







 3. MS Groove was the primary means of getting feedback 
from boarding party, fusion centers, and the Tactical 
Operational Command Center. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







4. MS Groove allowed me to quickly identify which problems 
I could address and which ones I need to pass on. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







Part V. The process 
 
1.  MS Groove improved my ability to meet the Tactical 
Operational Commander’s Objectives 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







2. MS Groove improved my ability to respond to the threat. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  














4.  Changes to my Standard Operating Procedure were worth 
using MS Groove. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly  







                    
 
B.  EXPERIMENTS THAT CAN PROVIDE TESTING 
  Currently, there are two experiments that helped 
provide the grounds for testing the metrics above and 
resolving the overarching questions outlined in Table 6: 
the Strong Angel III Disaster Relief Integration 
Demonstration and the Tactical Network Topology (TNT) MDA 
Experiment.  In both cases, MS Groove is the primary means 
of collaboration between entities. 
1. Strong Angel III Disaster Relief Demonstration 
Overview 
Strong Angel III is a low-key demonstration of 
globally relevant methods for improving resilience within 
any community under pressure. Strong Angel III is 
particularly designed to explore techniques and 
technologies that support the principle of resilience 
within a community that finds itself isolated and 
vulnerable.35  
a. Scenario 
In the demonstration the citizens of a community 
are deprived of power, cell phones, and Internet access, 
and are beyond the immediate reach of federal assistance. 
One key objective of this project is to effectively tap the 
expertise and creativity within an affected community, 
including through public-private partnerships. A second 
overarching objective is the development of social tools 





between responders and the population they serve during 
post-disaster reconstruction.”36
2. TNT MDA Experiment Overview 
The TNT MDA Experiment is a joint venture between the 
Naval Postgraduate School, US Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL).  The objective of this experiment is to continue to 
evaluate the use of networks, advanced sensors, and 
collaborative technology for rapid Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO); specifically, the ability for a Boarding 
Party to rapidly set-up ship-to-ship communications that 
permit them to search for radiation and explosive sources 
while maintaining contact with the mother ship, C2   
organizations, and collaborating with remotely located 
sensor experts.37
The MDA Experiment has increased in complexity over 
the last few years.  The initial experiment began with a 
coast guard cutter and a small diving vessel, the Cypress 
Sea as the target and mother ships for the boarding.  
Today, the TNT MIO experiment includes cargo vessels, a 
coast guard cutter, local and state law enforcement, LLNL, 
Biometrics Fusion Center, Maritime Intelligence Fusion 
Center West, and Coast Guard District Eleven as 
participants.  In addition, several federal agencies and 
foreign nations (Austria, Sweden, and Singapore) are 
observing remotely.  
a. Scenario 
The Scenario for TNT 06-4 was that the port of 
Hong Kong communicated to the Maritime Security Office 
                     
 36 www.strongangel3.net/about
37 Bordetsky, Alex. TNT 06-3 MIO Plan, June 2006, p. 1.  
(MSO) in the port of Oakland that they detected radiation 
on a container that was bound for the port of Oakland, but 
guards had their radiation sensors to high for local 
detection and arrest.  By coordinating with the US Coast 
Guard (USCG) and the United States Navy (USN) for 
assistance, the MSO, the USCG, and the USN detect the 
radiation source and the USCG District 11 orders the 
interdiction of the vessel.38  A network diagram of the TNT 
06-4 diagram as compiled by Georgios Stavroulakis is shown 
in Figure 6. 
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 38 Brian Rideout, et. al. TNT 06-4 MIO Plan, Scenario, p. 3. 
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V.   RESULTS 
A.  MS GROOVE EVALUATION 
MS Groove was the primary collaborative tool for both 
Strong Angel and TNT MIO Experiment.  As stated in Chapter 
IV, both experiments provided an opportunity to apply the 
metrics to evaluate MS Groove. 
1. Evaluation of MS Groove During Strong Angel III 
Based on observations and surveys taken at the 
Incident Command Post and the Emergency Operations Center, 
the following evaluation of MS Groove was conducted.  
During the ad hoc structure that developed during the 
Strong Angel III demonstration, MS Groove was one of the 
tools that enabled collaboration and file sharing.  The 
features used by the various Operations Centers were file 
sharing and whiteboard.   
  In terms of performance, the ad hoc information 
network established could not support the weight of all the 
users on MS Groove workspaces.  Without any clear structure 
to follow, users were sending data simultaneously.  The 
result was the collapse of the network and the need to 
recycle the disaster relief information network 
continuously throughout the exercise. In terms of 
effectiveness, MS Groove could not really prove itself due 
mainly to the attitudes of people.  Every person who 
brought technology to the Incident Command Post (ICP) 
wanted to use their technology during the demonstration.  
As a result, even though MS Groove was slated to be the 
main tool, it became one of several collaborative tools 
that were being used by the IC. In fact, the IC refused to 
even turn on MS Groove in his command post, because he 
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heard it was degrading the network.  As a result, data 
needed by the IC could not be received via MS Groove, but 
by VOIP phone.    
2. Evaluation of MS Groove During TNT Experiment 
Based on observations and surveys taken at the 
Tactical Operations Center, the USCG District 11 
Headquarters, and the Boarding Vessel, the following 
evaluation of MS Groove was conducted.  The features used 
during the experiment were file sharing, whiteboard, 
instant messenger, chat, and task manager.   
In terms of performance, the ad hoc information 
network established was able to support the weight of all 
the users on MS Groove workspaces, although there were only 
twenty five users active in the workspace during the 
experiment.  The network was able to maintain the weight of 
the program as users became active in the workspace.  More 
than 50% of packets across the network were Groove packets.   
In terms of Situational Awareness and Decision 
Support, MS Groove Task Manager was able to keep track of 
the necessary tasks and help provide a common understanding 
of the situation to develop.  This ability was able to 
foster cooperation between the various operations centers 
to be able to see what tasks still needed to happen to 
respond to the situation.  Alerts helped the Boarding 
Officer realize that new information needed to complete the 
mission was available in MS Groove.  
3. MS GROOVE CONCLUSIONS BASED ON BOTH EXPERIMENTS 
   The conclusions, therefore, of MS Groove is that MS 
Groove is a great tool when scalability is not a primary 
concern.  It should not be used in an environment where 
everyone needs to post large amounts of data on a network 
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simultaneously.  However, MS Groove when file sharing, 
discussion board, and task manager, are enabled the 
collaborative features of MS Groove make the tool a 
catalyst for transformation of hierarchical organizational 
structures into an ad hoc structure that can provide unity 
of effort for an incident commander. 
 
B.  STRONG ANGEL III OBSERVATIONS FOR METRIC REFINEMENT 
The Strong Angel III demonstration provided an 
excellent opportunity in seeing how an ad hoc 
organizational structure and information network can be 
established.   
1. People/Structure 
The first day of the exercise, numerous vendors 
arrived to demonstrate the capabilities of their 
technology.  For the first twenty-four hours, each vendor 
was limiting their vision to the capability of their 
technology.  Once vendors realized that other vendors could 
help demonstrate their capability, collaboration between 
people began.  However, unity of effort between vendors, 
non-governmental agencies, and other capabilities did not 
come about until the Incident Command Structure was 
established on the third day.  With an incident commander 
now dictating requirements and needs, each vendor began to 
cooperate with other vendors.   
As the week progressed, vendors began establishing 
relationships that helped achieve mission success.  One 
such example was the relationship between a 
satellite/digital network provider, a teleconference server 
provider, and a video/audio company that was providing data 
for a teleconference.  On the first sortie, there was a 
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slight disconnect between the players, and the information 
took about ten to fifteen minutes to transmit data back to 
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  By the second 
sortie, these same three companies had their equipment set 
up and operational within five minutes.  The only delay was 
that the EOC Manager was having a “press conference” and 
requested that the EOC dial into the video teleconference 
at a later time.  Once the EOC dialed in, the data was sent 
flawlessly. 
2. Technology 
The first day of Strong Angel III seemed like a trade 
show with technologies from all across the country being 
demonstrated for this exercise.  This caused several 
issues.  First was that most of the players were using 
different technologies that made it difficult for the teams 
to coordinate back to the Incident Commander.  On one 
sortie, a community assessment survey was established in a 
Groove workspace.  The problem was that the Incident 
Command Post (ICP) who would need the data for coordination 
of assets was not using MS Groove but another web based 
application.  The teams in the field had various 
technologies employed but only certain technologies were 
being monitored by the ICP or the EOC.  Voice not digital 
was the primary means of communicating vital data to the 
Decision makers. 
A second issue that emerged with the technology was 
interference and de-confliction.  Various mobile Network 
Operations Centers deployed to the Strong Angel III 
exercise, each performing their own demonstrations and 
experiments.  Many of these technologies operated on 
similar frequencies, restricted to unlicensed bands.  The 
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network had to be shut down and restarted from scratch to 
ensure there was little to no interference. 
A third issue that emerged was the use of MS Groove as 
the major collaborative tool.  Over 50% of the packets that 
were coming over the network came from Groove.  As 
scalability of the network increased, so did the clients in 
the Groove workspaces.  With vendors using Groove to post 
data on the network and without any guidance, post data 
simultaneously, the network barely supported itself for the 
first several hours.   
 
C.  TNT EXPERIMENT OBSERVATIONS FOR METRIC REFINEMENT 
The TNT experiment provided an excellent opportunity 
to see how technology can support collaboration within a 
semi-structured environment. 
1. People/Structure 
Unlike disaster relief operations, the MDA environment 
did have a semi-structured organization from start to 
finish.  The Maritime Security Office of the Port of 
Oakland (played by Sweden) was the main authority in 
coordination.  As in the case of disaster relief, command 
was transferred from local to state once the complexity 
increased.  In the case of the scenario, the incident 
commander shifted from the MSO to District 11 with the US 
Navy supporting District 11 efforts for interdiction.  The 
Boarding Party reported directly to the TOC, who in turn 
reported to District 11.  The collaboration on a peer-to-
peer relationship was between the boarding officer and the 
advisors at the various fusion centers and laboratories 
participating in the experiment. 
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2. Technology 
There were several technologies employed in the TNT 
06-4 experiments.  The primary means of voice communication 
was the Voice-Over-IP (VOIP) telephones.  The primary 
collaborative tool used during the experiment was of course 
MS Groove.  Again, MS Groove did place a significant amount 
of load on the network.  However, since the users were 
limited in the network, the network was able to support the 
loads.  In addition, the Electronic Wall (or E-wall) which 
collects alerts from various databases and posts them for 
watch standers was used both at the District 11 
Headquarters and the TOC to provide further situational 
awareness.  Finally, the Situational Awareness Agent (SA 
Agent), a homegrown product of NPS, interfaces with other 
agents to provide a visual picture using icons, GPS Data, 
alert postings, network performance, video feed, and IM 
capability, was further used by participants to monitor and 





A. CRITERIA ESTABLISHMENT 
The environments of Emergency Response and Maritime 
Domain Awareness are both complex and dynamic environments. 
Collaborative technologies are great catalysts for 
transforming both informational and organizational 
structures from hierarchies into peer-to-peer, ad hoc, and 
mesh structures that can respond to these complex and 
dynamic changes.  However, there are many technologies to 
pick from and use.  Ensuring that the right tool is 
selected will certainly help the process. 
As such, this thesis provided a baseline for criteria 
in selecting tools for Tactical level MDA and Emergency 
Response.  Measures of Effectiveness looked at Situational 
Awareness, Interoperability, Decision Support, Commander’s 
Intent, and Information Sharing.  Measures of Performance 
looked at Scalability, Network Effects, Information 
Availability, Information Security, Interoperability, and 
Feasibility.  Dimensional Parameters looked at Capability, 
System Requirements, and Information Security.  These 
Measures of Merit were derived from extending the NATO COBP 
for C2 Assessment methodology into the MDA Awareness and 
Emergency Response Relief Operations, both fields not 
normally associated with NATO.  The NATO COBP provides a 
methodology for establishing criteria that can be used to 
select the tool operating in a dynamic and complex 
environment.  It looks not only at Measures of Performance, 
or technical aspects of the tool, but also the social, 
cognitive, and informational networks needed to achieve 
mission results.  It currently is being used to assess 
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technology being used in Military Operations Other Than 
War.   
 
B.  THE FUTURE ROLE OF COLLABORATIVE TOOLS 
 Ad hoc organizational and informational structures 
are the best types of social and information networks 
suited for these types of environments.  Discussion boards, 
file sharing, and collaborative chat capabilities offered 
by companies will become much more needed for these 
organizations to develop into those architectures.  At the 
same time, people need to be taken into account.  If 
personnel do not want to use the tool, the tool can either 
be abandoned, as was the case with MS Groove during the 
Strong Angel III Demonstration, or a tool for micro-
management in a hierarchical organization.     
As the demand for file sharing, application sharing, 
and instant messaging tools becomes needed for those 
transformations to take place, the supply will also 
increase to meet this demand.  More than ever, analysts 
must ask questions and create the right criteria to 
evaluate the tools that are being approached into this 
scenario.   
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